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Operation Plan
6th MarDiv No. 1-45 (Annex ABLE - Intelligence)

Appendix (I)

D-2 ESTIMATED OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

Maps: Tactical map Southern OKINAWA, 1:25,000.

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

(a) Enemy strength:

(1) Estimate of troops on OKINAWA GUNTO as of 15 January, 1945.

SOUTHERN OKINAWA

<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Service and Construction</u>	<u>Total</u>
37,500	2,000	8,000	47,500 45,000

NORTHERN OKINAWA

4,000 500 4,500- 5,000

IE SHIMA

KERAMA RETTO

1,000 1,000-1,500
TOTAL ON OKINAWA GUNTO
45,000 2,000 8,000 55,000-58,000

TOTAL ON OKINAWA GUNTO

45,000 2,000 9,000 55,000-58,000

(2) Units presently identified include:

Eq 32a Army	-----	500	
Two standar Inf Div (17,000)	-----	34,000	
44th Ind mixed Brigade	-----	5,000	6,000
Non-divisional combat troops	-----	8,000	
1 Tk Regt (27 light and 64 medium).			
2 Ind AT Gun Bns.			
2 Mortar Bns.			
1 Med Arty Regt (24-150mm How).			
1 AAA Regt (18-75mm AA Guns).			

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ANSWER (1) = 2

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COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

OKINAWA ISLAND

(OPERATION ICEBERG)

MAP: RYUKYU RETTO PHOTO MAP 1:25,000.

I. MISSION

a. Summary of the situation

The military forces of the Japanese Empire are on the strategic defensive. All evidence indicates a reluctant withdrawal from territories in the PHILIPPINES, SOUTHERN ASIA, and the MALAY BARRIER to the inner defense zone of the Empire. The Japanese have powerful outlying bases in FORMOSA and in the RYUKYU RETTO. Bases along the CHINA coast and in the BONIN ISLANDS are of significance because of their strategic location. The UNITED STATES has achieved, in its seizure of the MARIANAS and in the reduction of the PHILIPPINES, a strategic breakthrough, and is pressing with mounting power toward the heart of the Japanese homeland. The nearest supporting bases to OKINAWA are in NORTHERN LUZON and, upon successful termination of operation DETACHMENT, on IWO JIMA. In accordance with a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas has determined to initiate operations for occupation of one or more positions in the NANSEI SHOTO and has directed the Central Pacific Task Forces to capture, occupy, defend and develop air and naval facilities on OKINAWA in order to provide a base for further operations against the Japanese homeland or the Chinese mainland.

b. Formulation of the mission

The III Phib Corps, reinforced, has been assigned the mission of landing on OKINAWA, securing the YONTAN AIRDROME, assisting the XXIV Corps, protecting the left (north) flank of the operation and advancing to succeeding objective lines on order of the Commanding General, 10th Army. In turn the III Phib Corps has established boundaries, intermediate objectives and prescribed a general scheme of maneuver which indicates when and generally how all major elements of the Corps will be landed.

The 1st Marine Division has been assigned the task of landing between the YONTAN AIRDROME and HAGUSHI town, assisting the 6th Marine Division in the capture of the YONTAN AIRDROME and then shifting its main effort to the right, assisting the XXIV Corps which makes the Army main effort.

The 6th Marine Division has been assigned the task of landing on LOVE-day, HOW-hour on beaches GREEN and RED, seizing the YONTAN AIRDROME and line L plus 3; then, upon Corps order to advance rapidly and seize line L plus 5. Thereafter to advance to succeeding Corps objective lines on order, and to protect the left (north) flank of the Corps.

Since the succeeding advances of the 6th Marine Division are all contingent upon the seizure of line L plus 3 which includes the YONTAN AIRDROME--which is the most important initial objective for the 10th Army--it is deduced that the primary mission of the 6th Marine Division is the seizure of line L plus 3. Subsequently and upon order, the mission of the Division is to advance to succeeding phase lines as well as to protect the left flank of the Army.

In consequence of the foregoing, the mission of the 6th Marine Division may be summarized as follows:

TO LAND LOVE-DAY, HOW-HOUR ON BEACHES GREEN AND RED ON THE WEST COAST OF OKINAWA ISLAND; SEIZE THE YONTAN AIRDROME AND LINE L PLUS 3 WITHIN ITS ZONE OF ACTION; ON ORDER TO ADVANCE TO LINE L PLUS 5 AND SUCCEEDING OBJECTIVES; AND TO PROTECT ARMY LEFT FLANK, IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE CAPTURE OF OKINAWA RETTO AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES THEREON.

III. SURVEY OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS

1. RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

a. Composition of forces }
b. Strength of forces } - Combined

Ground Forces

ENEMY

Estimate of troops on ICEBERG as of 15 Jan 45:

SOUTHERN OKINAWA

<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Service and Construction</u>	<u>Total</u>
37,500	2,000	8,000	47,000-48,000

NORTHERN OKINAWA

<u>Army</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Service and Construction</u>	<u>Total</u>
4,000		500	4,500-5,000
IE SHIMA			
2,500		500	3,000-5,000
KERAMA RETTO			
1,000			1,000-1,500
TOTAL ON OKINAWA GUNTO			
45,000	2,000	9,000	55,000-58,000

Units presently identified include:

Hq 32d Army	500
Two Standard Inf Divs (17,000)	34,000
44th Ind Mixed Brigade	5,000-6,000
Non-Divisional combat troops	8,000
1 Tank Regt (27 light and 64 medium)	
2 Ind AT Gun Bns	
2 Mortar Bns	
1 Med Arty Regt (24-150mm How)	
1 AAA Regt (18-75mm AA Guns)	
Air Force personnel (ground)	2,000
Service and construction troops	6,000

It is estimated by ComGen POA that a maximum of two additional infantry divisions (now standard triangular) can be installed on OKINAWA by March 1945. This would bring the total figure of troop opposition to approximately 90,000 at that time.

Enemy forces located in the zone of the 6th Mar Div are estimated to include the following:

- 1 Inf Regt
- 1 AAA Bn
- 2 Light Arty Bns
- 1 Tank Co
- 2 Bns of Avn ground troops

FRIENDLY

The 6th Mar Div Reinf consists of the equivalent of six (6) battalions of infantry along with supporting troops and amphibious vehicles to support the landing of assault forces over difficult hydrographic approaches.

Major elements of opposing ground forces:

	<u>US</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>MAXIMUM ANTICIPATED</u> (In 6th Mar Div zone and immediately adjacent thereto)
Infantry Battalions	6	5*	
Light Artillery Battalions	4	2	
Medium Artillery Battalions	0	0	
AA Artillery Battalions	0	1	
Medium Tank Battalions	1	1/3	
Armored LVT Battalions	1	0	

* 3 Battalions of an infantry regiment plus 2 battalions made up of airfield service, maintenance and ground troops.

Major armament of opposing ground forces:

	<u>US</u>	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>(In 6th Mar Div zone or immediately adjacent thereto)</u>
Heavy AA Guns	0	48	
Medium and Light AA Guns	0	80	
75mm Gun	0	12	
75mm Howitzers	12	8	
75mm Howitzers (LVT Mounted)	68	0	
105mm Howitzers	36	6	Note (1)
70mm Infantry Cannon	0	12	
37-47mm AT Guns	24	12	
Mortars and Grenade Dischargers	122	232	
.30 and .50 Cal Machine Guns	417	184	Note (2)
Tanks	47	12	Note (3)
Tank Destroyers	8	0	
Portable Flame Throwers	162		Note (4)

Note: (1) Recently Japanese divisions have employed 105mm howitzers rather than 75mm.
 (2) Includes airfield AA Machine Guns.
 (3) One tank Co with 12 tanks is presumably in the 6th Mar Div zone but due to the mobility of tanks this figure is not reliable.
 (4) There are no available figures on the T/O for Japanese flame throwers. A few will be present.

Deductions:- From the foregoing it appears that we enjoy an initial superiority in infantry of at least 6 to 5 with strong probability of further increasing our advantage by early release of reserves. We have a 2 to 1 advantage in light artillery, not considering the artillery potentialities of our LVT(A) battalions. We are at a disadvantage in AAA battalions, but the disparity is more than compensated for by Corps anti-aircraft organizations. Our tank superiority is at least 4 to 1. In consequence it is concluded that our total ground superiority is sufficient to justify a landing, but that our superiority in infantry battalions is not sufficient for a prolonged operation.

Air Forces

Our venture into the RYUKYU RETTO marks the first occasion on which our forces will be subject to direct attack by enemy aircraft which may be readily replenished or reinforced from the homeland. The 6th Mar Div zone of action is only 360 miles from the KYUSHU Airdromes and 300 miles from those on TANEGA. It is 170 miles from airdromes on AMAHI OSHIMA, and KIKAI JIMA, and the same distance from the fields on MIYAKO SHIMA. It is 340 miles from fields in northern FORMOSA and 450 miles from those in the SHANGHAI area. It may therefore be seen that, without giving consideration to air facilities on OKINAWA proper which may be operative at D-day and thereafter, the apprehension of vigorous and continued enemy air attack is a major factor. At the present time the enemy is reported to have some 400 aircraft concentrated in the FORMOSA-RYUKYU area. It may be assumed that our most intensive pre-landing efforts will not succeed in destroying all of these aircraft, or in preventing their partial reconstitution.

Despite all of the foregoing, our preponderance in carrier based aircraft and the fact that OKINAWA is within range of both light bombers and heavy fighters, indicate that during the landing phase and immediately thereafter we will enjoy heavy air superiority.

Air Deduction:- We may anticipate preponderant air superiority during the landing phase and immediately thereafter. Upon withdrawal of our carrier forces and until ground aircraft are firmly established ashore we may anticipate that the enemy can exercise at least intermittent air superiority.

Naval Forces

The American Navy is dominate in the PHILIPPINES-CHINA SEA area. The naval force constituted for support of the OKINAWA landings is of sufficient magnitude to engage

effectively any force which the Japanese may be able to assemble from his dispersed centers of naval strength which extend all the way from SINGAPORE to the KURILES.

Deductions:-Our naval superiority is great, and as a result should insure to a considerable degree the security of transports from seaborne and undersea attack. In addition, the gunfire support available in the supporting naval force must have a strong and beneficial effect on the progress of the action.

Combat Efficiency

Enemy forces in the OKINAWA area will in all probability have, as their nucleus, elements of trained MANCHURIAN troops with a full complement of arms, and embodying the latest Japanese organization. All evidence points to the certainty that the troops defending OKINAWA are alert, well trained and of the highest order among Japanese forces.

Our forces are excellently trained; in fine physical condition, thoroughly equipped and include a considerable leavening of veterans.

Deductions:-Since well trained American troops have invariably demonstrated a marked superiority over well trained Japanese troops, it is deduced that combat efficiency favors us.

Concluding Deduction, Relative Combat Power

We are superior on the ground, afloat and will have air superiority at least during the period of the landing. In consequence it is deduced that the initial ship-to-shore operation will probably be successful. However, our initial advantage may be materially minimized by Japanese ability to execute reinforcement or counterattack by air, to move his mobile forces within the island, or to execute minor reinforcement by sea. It is concluded, therefore, that our unquestioned early superiority will diminish somewhat until the full force of the Division's power can be developed.

2. REINFORCEMENTS

a. Enemy forces which may be moved to reinforce the OKINAWA garrison are listed herewith:

NANSEI SHOTO

AMAMI	9,900-10,900
TOKUNO	4,200
KIKAI	3,500-3,700
DAITO	4,000-4,300
MIYAKO	15,000-16,000
ISHIGAKI	7,300-7,500
IRIOMOTE	5,000
TOTAL	57,000-62,000

OTHER AREAS

SHANGAI AREA	75,000
FORMOSA	84,000
KYUSHU	110,000
TOTAL	269,000

In FORMOSA there are currently reported a total of 106,000-109,000 troops with 84,000 combat troops. These have been partially identified as three infantry divisions, one Ind mixed brigade, and one tank regiment.

FORMOSA by the shortest airline route is approximately 2 hours flying time from OKINAWA. From TAKAO the Japanese base in Southern FORMOSA flying time by transport aircraft is 3 hours. Ship convoys could make the run in approximately 37 hours.

Included in the figures for KYUSHU are elements of an airborne brigade. This brigade consists of 5 regiments of from 600 - 750 men each. The brigade also includes 3 regiments of transport aircraft in which paratroops can be carried. The transports used are TCPSYs, which have a range of 1,200 miles and a speed of 150 MPH.

Two of the paratroop regiments are believed to have been sent to the PHILIPPINES with probably one air transport regiment. This leaves at least 3 paratroop regiments and 2 transport regiments with a total combat complement from 1,800 to 2,250 within 2 hours striking distance of OKINAWA.

Transport ships could make the run from KAGOSHIMA on KYUSHU in 40 hours and from NAGASAKI in 45½ hours.

One division is currently reported in the city of SHANGAI. However, three others are within one hundred miles of SHANGAI and could conceivably be dispatched to SHANGAI and embarked in a period of two weeks. This would depend upon the condition of the divisions, and the shipping available in SHANGAI at the time.

Not to be overlooked is the presence in this city of the SHANGHAI SNLF with a complement of around 2,000. It must also be pointed out that the 12th and 13th Regiments of the 3d PARACHUTE DIVISIONS have been located near NANKING.

Troop transports sailing from SHANGHAI to the 6th Marine Division zone of action could make the trip in about 50 hours. Flying time by transport aircraft would be 2½ hours.

Assistance From Neighboring Troops, Not Reinforcements

According to available information there are 4,000-5,000 enemy troops to the north of OKINAWA outside of the 6th Marine Division zone of action. Sufficient water transport for movement of these troops is available in the form of coastal craft and fishing boats.

On almost all islands our forces have seized to date, the enemy has had some engineer units present to unload ships and work supplies across the beach. They can roughly be compared to the U.S. Army Port Battalions. These engineer units are equipped with barges and it may be safely assumed that a quantity of them are present on OKINAWA. On the average 75 of these barges can transport a regiment at a speed of 8 knots.

Reinforcement by the enemy from the south of the 6th Marine Division will probably not be attempted since the troops in that area will be fully occupied.

FRIENDLY

Immediately available within the III Phib Corps is a reserve of one RCT. Within the 10th Army there is an additional division available as reinforcement for elements of the Army.

Deduction: While the enemy is capable of materially reinforcing his garrison in the 6th Marine Division zone by air, water and overland, it is considered that for the two weeks prior to L-O-E-day such reinforcements will be held to a minimum by our preparatory air and naval bombardment. Following D-day the enemy's capability for reinforcement will be further reduced by our growing preponderance both ashore and in the air. In consequence it is considered that while forces available for enemy reinforcement far exceed those immediately available to us, reinforcement considerations are roughly equal because of our preponderance afloat and in the air.

TIME AND SPACE

Time and space factors as concerns major localities connected with the problem are as follows:

From NAHA OKINAWA	NAUTICAL MILES	TRANSPORT (12 Knots)	BARGE (8)	AIR (200)	NAVAL UNITS (20 Knots)
AMAMI O SHIMA	135	11 hrs	17 hrs	3/4	7 hrs
MIYAKO SHIMA	160	13	20	4/5	8
NORTHERN FORMOSA	335	28		1 3/4	17
KAGOSHIMA, KYUSHU	350	29		1 3/4	17 1/2
SHANGHAI	450	38		2 1/4	22 1/2
TAKAO, FORMOSA	465	39		2 1/4	23
OSAKA	645	54		3 1/4	32
IWO JIMA	740	62		3 3/4	37
MANILA	800	67		4	40
LEYTE	900	75		4 1/2	45
PELELIU	1190	99		6	60
ULITHI	1200	100		6	60
SALPAN	1210	101		6	60
GUAM	1230	102		6	61
ENIWETOK	2140	178		11	107
PEARL HARBOR	4040	337		20	202

Time factors for movement within OKINAWA are:

To 6th Mar Div Zone	MARCH (dispersed formation at 1/2 MPH)	MOTORIZED (night movement at 15 MPH)	BARGE (8 knots)
From NAHA-SHURI Sector	6 hrs	3/5 hrs	1 hr
From KAFENA-ASHI Sector	2	1/5	-
From IE SHIMA	-	-	2 1/2
From MOTOBU PENINSULA	13	1 1/3	2 1/2

On tentative D-day there will be 13 1/2 hours of daylight. Morning twilight begins at 0555. Sunset is at 1845 with darkness complete at 1940. The moon will be in the last quarter with moonrise at 2155.

The Japanese are materially nearer their supporting bases than are our forces. All other things being equal the Japanese are in a position to execute reinforcement by air or sea, or to counterattack by the same means before we

are firmly established on the island. We could be attacked by air at any time on or after LOVE-day and our supporting naval force could be attacked by sea during the same period.

Deduction:-All other factors ignored, time and space favor the enemy. He, however, has small hope of effectively employing this superiority because of our almost complete control of the sea approaches and our dominant air position.

4. DISPOSITIONS

Little concrete information is at hand concerning the precise dispositions of enemy forces in the 6th Marine Division zone of action. It is apparent, however, that he has constructed positions for approximately one regiment on the dominating terrain in the vicinity of the YONTAN AIRDRONE and has organized light beach defenses in the 6th Marine Division zone. There are, in addition, organized positions southwest of YONTAN AIRDRONE of sufficient size to deploy about two companies and a position of similar size north of the Airdrome in the vicinity of Hill 400. There are further organized localities in the hilly area east of the Airdrome and an organized company position in the ZAIWA-MISAKI area. There are indications that the approaches to ISHIKAWA Isthmus are covered by approximately two companies.

It is anticipated that two battalions of light artillery will be present in the 6th Marine Division zone of action with the possible addition of a mountain artillery battalion. Because of incomplete air photo coverage it is assumed that the artillery estimate is incomplete.

On and around YONTAN AIRDRONE there are about 65 heavy AA positions, with 48 observed as occupied, as well as about 140 automatic AA positions with 80 occupied. About 40 heavy machine gun positions have also been located in the YONTAN AIRDRONE area. All of the foregoing indicates a clear determination on the part of the enemy to defend the YONTAN AIRDRONE in strength, with further dispositions in depth extending into the mountainous area to the east and north of the Airdrome. Drawing lessons from previous operations, it is logical to assume that the Japanese have well concealed and covered centers of resistance organized in the rugged inland area, and that advantage has been taken of the excellent defilade for emplacement of howitzer artillery. The Japanese are confronted with the painful task of defending a long coastline on both the west and east sides of the island and in consequence it may be assumed that they are unable to defend all possible landing areas in strength. If we were to land simultaneously on beaches GREEN and RED with 4 battalions abreast we would, within less than one hour, place ashore a force superior in numbers to that which it is anticipated the Japanese will have in opposition to us in

our zone. However, the assault landing troops will not be disposed initially in such a manner as to thoroughly develop their offensive capabilities.

Deduction:—Although our preparatory air and sea bombardment, along with pre-D-day preliminary operations, will with little question prevent our achieving strategic surprise it may be deduced that we can maintain tactical surprise until the point of our landing is disclosed, since the enemy is quite unable to defend all probable landing areas in strength. Because of this fact, and of the fact that swift concentration and displacement will be difficult for the enemy because of our air, sea and artillery superiority it is deduced that dispositions favor us.

5. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

While it is likely the Japanese military forces have ample supply of ammunition and rations, it is known that they have had difficulty in establishing adequate food reserves. On the other hand, the enemy can resupply from the home islands within 2 days by sea and within 2 hours by air. Furthermore, the arrival of their supplies can easily be controlled and timed to coincide with any relaxation of our air or sea defenses. Against this advantage, our supplies are ample, as planned, and have been set up to arrive by a schedule which should insure adequate logistic support. Control by our naval forces of the sea areas around the target will probably jeopardize Japanese ability to resupply in sufficient quantity. While some enemy equipment and supplies will fall into our hands, no dependence can be placed upon availability to us of Japanese material, equipment or labor. Our medical means are sufficient to support the operation. Our air resupply and evacuation should be functioning by LOXE plus 10 days. Troop labor and landing craft are sufficient for debarkation. No port facilities will be available initially at the target. Terrain and hydrographic features will effect supply and evacuation adversely. As illustrated herewith:

a. Current information indicates that reef landings are a strong probability. In this event, any destruction of LVTs or DUKWs before, during or after landing will seriously disrupt, but will not stop, our flow of supply. If such destruction should occur, we may employ LVTs or DUKWs of friendly units, blast a landing into the reef or construct pontoon causeways.

b. Successful enemy blocking of all exits from the beach would, of course, be fatal to the supply as well as the tactical plan. Consequently sufficient explosives and

heavy construction equipment must land with the shore parties.

c. The commanding terrain held by the enemy initially will permit direct enfilade and flanking enemy fire and observation on the beach and flat ground immediately inland from the escarpment. This requires us to clear all personnel and material rapidly from the beach and may result in losses of supply and evacuation installations both on the beach and inland.

Deductions: - The factors outlined above, when considered alone indicate supply and evacuation considerations to favor the enemy. These considerations will, however, be to a great degree nullified by our superiority in arms.

6. HYDROGRAPHY, TERRAIN, METEOROLOGY AND OTHER FACTORS

(For detailed information see D-2 Study of the Theater of Operations, Part I)

a. Hydrography

The total length of coastline in the Division landing area is about 7000 yards, extending south from the northwestern tip of the ZANPA MISAKI PENINSULA to the right (south) Division boundary. There are considered to be 2,935 yards of usable landing beach, consisting of 10 beaches ranging from 100 to 560 yards in length.

A shallow fringing reef, with scattered coral heads, borders the entire beach. The depth of water over the reef is unknown at this time but in most places it is likely to be no more than 3 feet at low tide and many places may be dry at low spring tides. Along a fraction of its extent the fringing reef approaches the character of a barrier reef in that there is deeper water between the crest of the reef and the shoreline. The distance from the shore to the outer edge of the reef is roughly 1,300 yards at the north of the Division zone, narrowing to about 200 yards at the southern extremity of the zone. The average width is from 300 to 400 yards. Seaward of the reef the bottom drops swiftly to depths as great as 60 feet. There appear to be no boat obstacles seaward of the reef.

The beaches range from 3 to 30 yards in width and are composed largely of coral sand. Occasional rocky points interrupt the beach and extend out into the sea. Much of the beach is backed by a steep scarp averaging about 20 feet in height. The beach gradient is moderate to steep in the

6th Marine Division zone. More detailed information may be found in Study of the Theater of Operations, Part I.

Maximum tidal range during springs is about 5.5 feet. Minimum range during neaps is about 2 feet. The minimum depth during neap low tides are about 3 feet above mean low spring tides. There are two tides per day, with a difference of about 2 feet between successive lows.

It is estimated that there will be surf greater than 6 feet in height on 10 days in April. It is estimated that surf may be greater than 9 feet on 4 days in April.

b. Terrain

The general topography of that part of the island north of ISHICHA is rugged in the extreme; that south of the isthmus consists primarily of terraced hills and alluvial flats. The zone of action of the 6th Marine Division, from the beach to approximately 2000 yards inland, consists of coastal plain which gives way to rugged hills forming corridors, running north and south. Tracked and wheeled vehicles will be restricted in movement, except on roads and trails, in this rugged inland terrain. Several small towns and numerous scattered houses are located in Division zone of action. Most houses are surrounded by a dense row of trees and low stone walls. Numerous burial vaults exist on the high ground near towns, and can be utilized by the defender as strong points. Northwest of the YONTAN AIRDROME is the central west tunnel area with over fifty (50) tunnel entrances which may be used by the defender as storage areas, shelters and defensive localities. The YONTAN AIRDROME may be approached from either the north or south, but the area west of the field is quite open and affords the defender excellent fields of fire. The road net is good in the Division zone until the mountainous terrain is reached. Superior observation is afforded the defender from the high ground about 1 1/2 miles inland. The ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA is relatively flat and ends with steep cliffs at the beach.

c. Metacorology

(1) Climate is warm and moist. Cloudiness is relatively high but there is little fog. Winds are strong in winter and light in summer except when a typhoon sweeps north from the MARIANAS. Humidity is high.

(2) Temperature. Average annual temperature is 72.2°F, with daily variations between 11°F and 15°F. There is very little change from summer to winter. There is little need for heavy clothing.

(3) Winds and rain. The period from March to

June is transitional between the winter and summer monsoons. The normal air flow is from the NNE with force of 3 or 4.

(4) Rainfall. Mean rainfall is 6 inches in April increasing to 9 in May and 10 in June.

(5) Cloudiness. Cloud cover averages 8/10 over land and 6/10 over the ocean from March to May. Aerial observations and bombing will be somewhat hampered from March to May.

d. Other Factors.

(1) Military operations on land are best conducted before May, when rainfall is least.

(2) High level bombing and photographic conditions are best after June, when cloudiness is least.

(3) Low level air support missions are favorable throughout the year.

(4) Parachute missions can be best carried out from April through June when winds are lightest.

(5) Chemical warfare is most applicable in the dry, cool, winter season.

(6) Construction is easiest in the winter season, when temperatures are comfortable and rainfall least.

(7) Amphibious operations can be best carried out in May and June, with light winds and least likelihood of storms.

(8) Carrier task forces can operate in any season. Small carriers will be hampered by choppy seas from October until about April. Typhoons will interrupt operations occasionally from July to October.

Deductions:-In general the terrain favors the enemy because of the excellent observation which he will be afforded throughout the campaign. Likewise, the rugged mountainous areas which characterize the later phases of the operation will militate against effective employment of our armored elements. However, the initial 1500 yards within the 6th Marine Division zone lends itself admirably to the employment of armor and close support assault weapons.

7. a. The Japanese technique with which we are familiar, namely combat in the jungle and in terrain where armored power cannot be completely developed, is not adapted to the conditions under which the initial fight for the YONTAN AIRDROME will take place. This ground, offering great opportunity for employment of armor, and a limitless number of artillery position areas, further contributes to the employment of tactical means which are most effective in combating the Japanese.

b. OKINAWA is Japanese territory. This is the first occasion on which our forces have actually invaded his homeland. It is to be anticipated that fanatical as his resistance has been when fighting on foreign soil, his efforts will be redoubled in defense of one of his home islands. In consequence we must anticipate the task of searching out every ravine and every village for Japanese elements which will resist to the bitter end.

III ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

1. Three enemy courses of action appear worthy of consideration. They are:

a. Course I:-To conduct a light defense of the beach line and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME from prepared positions along its western perimeter.

b. Course II:-To conduct a light defense of the beaches and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME initially from prepared positions along its western perimeter and supported in depth by a well-organized defense along the high ground north and east of the airfield.

c. Course III:-To execute large scale reinforcement or counter-offensive activity by ground, air and sea in conjunction with Courses I and II above.

An examination of the defensive terrain available to the enemy and exploration of the known defensive installations within our zone indicates that a logical general course of action would embrace a light beach defense with a subsequent occupation by the main force of successive defensive positions, the first being on the seaward approaches to the YONTAN AIRDROME and the second on the high ground north and east of the Airdrome. The great extent of accessible beach area militates strongly against a defensive scheme predicated upon a decisive beach defense. Small and uncoordinated counter offensive activity on the ground is a strong probability, but considering the anticipated friendly air cover, concentration of large counterattacking forces will be most difficult. Airborne counterattacks must be anticipated, and, particularly

if executed at night when our fighter opposition is at its lowest point of effectiveness, may be of considerable dimensions.

IV OWN COURSES OF ACTION

1. Appreciation of the Mission

The 6th Marine Division has been directed to capture the YONTAN AIRDROME and the Corps objectives north and east thereof, prepared for further offensive action to the northeast. Configuration of the beaches materially restricts the Division in the localities where it can land. In consequence it is restricted in avenues of approach to the Airdrome and the key inland terrain. Since the YONTAN AIRDROME is a most important initial objective of the 10th Army, our basic consideration must necessarily be the deployment and scheme for expeditious seizure of that installation.

The terrain over which the 6th Marine Division will initially pass adapts itself well to rapid movement, and it is clear that any course of action adopted by the Division should include swift movement across the rising plain leading to the airfield and to the high ground north thereof. The Airdrome itself is ideal terrain for rapid movement of armored elements but is in turn dominated by Hill 900 to the north and by the high ground at 9383 in the 1st Marine Division zone.

The Division is to some degree restricted in its movements on the right due to the existing boundary between divisions and to the necessity for coordinating our movements with those of the 1st Marine Division. A further consideration in analysis of our mission is the fact that L plus 3 is the first Corps phase line which we are assigned, and the complete occupation of this line involves a movement to clear out the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA.

In view of its location on our flank, its size and extended coast line, and the native population in the villages included in this area, the seizure of the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA cannot be undertaken until the Airdrome and high ground northeast thereof has been secured. This operation will require the employment of the Corps reserve, initially taken from this division, and will undoubtedly delay the complete seizure of the L plus 3 Line.

Four courses of action appear worthy of consideration:-

a. Course I

To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT from the right CT in Division Reserve and, making the main

effort on the left, to seize Hill 400 and the high ground adjacent thereto; then, by flanking action from the north to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast of the airfield; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

b. Course II

To land two CTs in assault, initially retaining one LT (less one Co) from the right CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the left, to seize Hill 400 and the high ground adjacent thereto; then shifting the main effort to the right to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast thereof; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

c. Course III

To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT from the left CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the right to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 to the northeast by flanking action from the south; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

d. Course IV

To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT (less one Co) from the right CT in Division Reserve, and by a coordinated attack with the main effort initially on the left to seize Hill 400, YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of the Line L plus 3 northeast of the airfield, thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

V. DETERMINATION OF COMMANDER'S BEST COURSE OF ACTION

a. Analysis and comparison of opposing courses of action:

1. Our Course I: To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT from the right CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the left, to seize Hill 400 and the ground adjacent thereto; then, by flanking action from the north to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast of the airfield; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course I: To conduct a light defense of the beach line and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME from prepared positions along its western perimeter.

ADVANTAGES

1. We place the preponderance of our power in a position to outflank enemy installations on the perimeter and western approaches to the airfield.
2. By orienting the majority of our force on the left we are well deployed for the execution of our flank protection mission.
3. The distance from the GREEN beaches to Hill 400 and the key terrain adjacent thereto is shorter than any other route to the area available to us.
4. Our forces are soundly deployed for combating counter-offensive action from the direction of ZAMPA-MISAKI.
5. Since advance on to the Airdrome proper is to a degree dependent upon seizure of Hill 400 area, withdrawal of the Division Reserve from the right regiment appears logical and advantageous.
6. Does not require right CT to cross airfield when exposed to flanking fire from the high ground to the north.
7. The avenues of approach inland from the GREEN beaches are superior to the avenues extending inland from the RED beaches and hence encourage employment of the major portion of our forces on the left.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Deployment of the major element of our force on the left, with the rapid penetration anticipated to result from such deployment, may establish a salient which might permit effective enemy counterattack either from the direction of the YONTAN AIRDROME or from the northeast.
2. The task of the right regiment, involving a landing on the beach wherein some defenses have already been located; an advance across defended ground for about 1100 yards to the first high ground, and the necessity for maintaining contact with the 1st Marine Division on the right may be beyond the capabilities of a 2 Battalion Organization, particularly so if that regiment chooses to retain a reserve as large as a company.
3. The GREEN beaches are widely separated and present a serious problem in coordination. If the main effort were made on the right over the RED beaches closer coordination could be insured.
4. The town of ZACHINI and the deep ravine to the south and east are serious

8. By retention of an entire landing team in Division Reserve the Commander retains for himself a strong maneuver element capable of exerting powerful influence on the action.

obstacles to flanking action from that direction. Difficulty in crossing these would delay seizure of airfield and advance of right CT.

5. If left CT fails to execute a rapid advance inland and quick seizure of Hill 400 the advance of the right CT will be held up by flanking fire from the high ground to its north. This will expose the left flank of the 1st Marine Division.

2. Our Course I:- To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT from the right CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the left, to seize Hill 400 and the high ground adjacent thereto; then, by flanking action from the north to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast of the airfield; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

VERSUS .

Enemy Course II: - To conduct a light defense of the beaches and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME, initially from prepared positions along its western perimeter, and supported in depth by a well-organized defense along the high ground north and east of the airfield.

ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy the same advantages outline in 1. above plus:

2. The task of the right assault regiment will be reduced in magnitude if the enemy does not choose to defend the Airdrome area decisively.

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 1. above although the possibility of over-extending the right assault regiment is somewhat diminished if the enemy resistance in the immediate Airdrome area is of lesser dimensions.

3. Our Course I:- To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT from the right CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the left to seize Hill 400 and the high ground adjacent thereto; then, by flanking action from the north, to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast of the airfield; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA,

prepared to continue the advance to line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course III:- To execute large scale reinforcement or counter-offensive activity by ground, air, and sea in conjunction with Courses I and II.

ADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy the same advantages listed in 1. above plus:
2. Emphasis on capture of the key terrain in the Hill 400 area at the earliest possible time, by deploying the major element of our force in that zone, offers good possibility of our being on highly defensible terrain at the earliest possible moment.
3. Retention of an entire landing team in Division Reserve increases the capability of the Division Commander to exercise strong influence in the conduct of anti-airborne or anti-seaborne operations.

4. Our Course II:- To land two CTs in assault, initially retaining one LF (less one company) from the right CT in Division Reserve and making the main effort on the left to seize Hill 400 and the high ground adjacent thereto; then shifting the main effort to the right, to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast thereof; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMFA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

DISADVANTAGES

1. We are subject to the same disadvantages listed in 1. above. Particularly worthy of deliberation is the fact that a swift penetration on the left will leave a dangerous salient which will invite counter-attack.
2. Retention of an entire landing team in Division Reserve may deny the Commander of the right assault regiment an adequate local reserve for opposing strong enemy counter-offensive action aimed down the boundary between Divisions, or for attacking airborne troops landed in his zone.

VERSUS

Enemy Course I:- To conduct a light defense of the beach line and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME from prepared positions along its western perimeter.

ADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy all of the advantages listed in 1. above plus:
2. The retention of a Bn. less one (1) company in Division Reserve releases a sorely needed company to the right assault regiment for use as regimental reserve and in consequence increases the probability that that regiment will be able to effectively handle the strong positions west of the airdrone.

DISADVANTAGES

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 1. and 3. above with considerably less apprehension that the right assault regiment may be confronted with a task beyond its capabilities.
2. The reserve in the hands of the Division Commander is reduced in size and consequently his ability to influence the action in case of counterattack is commensurately reduced.

5. Our Course II:- To land two CTs in assault, initially retaining one LT (less 1 company) from the right CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the left, to seize Hill 400 and the high ground adjacent thereto; then, shifting the main effort to the right, to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast thereof; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course II:- To conduct a light defense of the beaches and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME, initially from prepared positions along its western perimeter, and supported in depth by a well-organized defense along the high ground north and east of the airfield.

ADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy all the advantages described in 4. above.

DISADVANTAGES

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 1., 1 and 3 above plus:

2. Assignment of an additional company as reserve of the right assault regiment may, under circumstances where resistance is light in the zone of that regiment, result in an excess of force in that zone and hence an uneconomical distribution of forces at hand.

6. Our Course II:- To land two CTs in assault, initially retaining one LT (less 1 company) from the right CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the left, to seize Hill 400 and the high ground adjacent thereto; then shifting the main effort to the right to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast thereof; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course III:- To execute large scale reinforcement or counter-offensive activity by ground, air, and sea in conjunction with Courses I. and II.

ADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy all of the advantages listed in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 above plus:

2. The right assault regiment is prepared, by virtue of its additional company as a reserve, for effective opposition to enemy counter-offensive activity in its zone.

DISADVANTAGES

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 1, 1 and 3 above plus:

2. The reserve in the hands of the Division Commander is reduced in size and consequently his ability to influence the action in the event of counterattack is commensurately reduced.

7. Our Course III:- To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT from the left CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the right, to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 to the northeast by flanking action from the south; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course I:- To conduct a light defense of the beach line and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME from prepared positions along its western perimeter.

ADVANTAGES

1. By launching our major effort on the right and by employing flanking action from the south of the YONTAN AIRDROME there is excellent possibility that a strong defensive position to the west of the Airdrome may be effec-

DISADVANTAGES

1. Within our zone of action we are seriously restricted in maneuver room to the south of the Airdrome, and in order to employ this course effectively it would be neces-

2. The YONTAN AIRDROME is our prime initial objective and the terrain leading to it from the RED beaches invites swift mechanized action. In consequence a rapid decision might be anticipated.

3. The task of maintaining contact and coordinating the advance with the 1st Marine Division on the right would be facilitated by this course.

4. Movement of assault forces around the escarpment to the south of the Airdrome will to some degree provide defilade from mortar and artillery fire initiating in the Hill 400 region.

5. Placing the preponderance of our force on the right may aid in outflanking the Hill 400 area and thus assist the left assault regiment in accomplishment of its mission.

sary to move our main effort through the left of the 1st Marine Division zone of action. The coordination required by such a scheme would be of considerable dimensions.

2. We are assigned the task of protecting the left (north) flank of the Corps. To place the preponderance of our force on the right appears to deviate somewhat from execution of our mission as stated.

3. The YONTAN AIRDROME is dominated by the Hill 400 area and the hill mass in the 1st Marine Division zone, south of CHINA. To move assault infantry into the bare Airdrome area without consideration given to the seizure of the dominating hills to the north and east might have serious consequence.

4. The left assault regiment, employing the GREEN beaches, has a difficult task in coordination because of the distance between the beaches as well as protecting its left flank. To withdraw a landing team from this regiment might leave it incapable of establishing and maintaining contact between its assault elements and expose the Division left flank to counterattack.

5. The reduction of the villages of HANZA and ZACHINI, and the capture of the Hill 400 area promises to be a problem of some magnitude. Withdrawal of a landing team from the regiment assigned to this task appears to lack soundness.

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8. Our Course III:- To land two CTs in assault; retaining one LT from the left CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the right, to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 to the northeast by flanking action from the south; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course II:- To conduct a light defense of the beaches and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME, initially from prepared positions along its western perimeter, and supported in depth by a well-organized defense along the high ground north and east of the airfield.

ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy the same advantages listed in 7. above except that the opportunity for flanking action on defenses fronting the YONTAN AIRDROME is of lesser consequence.

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 7. above.

9. Our Course III:- To land two CTs in assault; retaining one LT from the left CT in Division Reserve and, making the main effort on the right, to seize YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of Line L plus 3 to the northeast by flanking action from the south; thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and successive Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course III:- To execute large scale reinforcement or counter-offensive activity by ground, air, and sea in conjunction with Courses I and II.

ADVANTAGES

DISADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy the same advantages listed in 7. and 8. above plus:

1. We suffer all of the disadvantages listed in 7. and 8. above plus:

2. We are well disposed to counter powerful enemy counter-attack which might be launched down the boundary between divisions.

2. Our weakness on the left might, in the event of enemy amphibious infiltration on the BLACK beaches or airborne reinforcement of the

ZAMPA-MAZAKI area, result in a serious disruption of our offensive activities and a consequent compromise of our initial mission.

10. Our Course IV:- To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT (less one company) from the right CT in Division Reserve, and by a coordinated attack with the main effort initially on the left to seize Hill 400, YONTAN AIRDROME, and that part of Line L plus 3 northeast of the airfield, thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course I:- to conduct a light defense of the beach line and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME from prepared positions along its western perimeter.

ADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy all of the advantages listed in 4. above plus:
2. Our right regiment is given greater latitude in its conduct, to the end that if progress is not difficult that regiment may continue its rapid advance across the Airdrome area before the enemy has time to fully recover from the preparatory bombardment.
3. Should the 1st Marine Division move rapidly forward in its zone, adoption by us of this course of action will simplify the important task of maintaining contact with that Division.
4. If the 1st Marine Division encounters difficulty in its attack on the village of SOBE a rapid advance on the part of the right assault regiment might assist the 1st Marine Division in its movement to the eastward.

DISADVANTAGES

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 4. above plus:
2. A premature movement onto the YONTAN AIRDROME prior to seizure of the high ground dominating that locality might result in excessive casualties without commensurate return.
3. Should the operations of the left assault regiment be impeded by heavy opposition in the villages and high ground in its zone a rapid advance across the Airdrome by the right assault regiment might result in a dangerous salient permitting effective enemy counterattack from the north.

11. Our Course IV:- To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT (less one Co) from the right CT in Division Reserve, and by a coordinated attack with the main effort initially on the left to seize Hill 400, YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of the Line L plus 3 northeast of the Airdrome, thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course II:- To conduct a light defense of the beaches and a strong defense of the YONTAN AIRDROME, initially from prepared positions along its western perimeter, and supported in depth by a well-organized defense along the high ground north and east of the Airdrome.

ADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy all of the advantages listed in 10. above.

DISADVANTAGES

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 10. above with even more apprehension to the danger of advancing rapidly across the Airdrome area while the enemy is heavily entrenched in organized positions on the high ground north and east of the Airdrome.

12. Our Course IV:- To land two CTs in assault, retaining one LT (less one Co) from the right CT in Division Reserve, and by a coordinated attack with the main effort initially on the left to seize Hill 400, YONTAN AIRDROME and that part of the Line L plus 3 northeast of the Airdrome, thereafter to seize the remainder of Line L plus 3 and the ZAMPA-MISAKI PENINSULA, prepared to continue the advance to Line L plus 5 and succeeding Corps objectives.

VERSUS

Enemy Course III:- To execute large scale reinforcement or counter-offensive activity by ground, air and sea in conjunction with Courses I. and II.

ADVANTAGES

1. We enjoy all of the advantages listed in 10. above plus:

2. We are well disposed to oppose a coordinated counter-attack on our left flank.

DISADVANTAGES

1. We suffer the same disadvantages listed in 10. above plus the fact that the reserve in the hands of the Division Commander is reduced in size and consequently his ability to undertake rapid aggressive

3. This course, permitting rapid movement to the north-eastward by the right assault regiment, may result in our occupying good defensive ground in that zone at the earliest practicable moment.

action to oppose any form of counterattack is commensurately reduced.

b. Final Evaluation of Own Courses of Action

1. By employing Course I we insure the placement of our main effort in the zone where it can be most effectively developed and, by so doing, achieve a high probability of capturing the important Hill 400 terrain at the earliest possible moment. Likewise, the weight of our power is on the left, and disposed so as to best execute that portion of our mission which pertains to protection of the left (north) flank. In addition, the Division Commander has in his hands a strong maneuvering force capable of opposing sea landing or airborne counterattack. However, there is strong indications that the multiple task of the right assault regiment may not be effectively discharged with the two battalions which this course provides.

2. By employing Course II we still place the main effort and the emphasis of the Division's power on the left in the zone where it can in all probability most effectively accomplish the initial mission. However, we reduce the reserve available to the Division Commander, profiting in turn by the fact that the right assault regiment is provided with a reserve, thus obviating the necessity for unbalancing that organization in order to constitute a reserve from the two battalions available. Likewise, we provide greater assurance that the right assault regiment can effectively discharge the tasks which are required of it.

3. By employing Course III we shift the impetus of the Division's power to the right of the Airdrome and although this course may provide an effective avenue of approach to the area east of the Hill 400 mass, it involves a complicated maneuver requiring movement into the adjacent Division's zone with its attendant difficulties in coordination. Likewise, this course removes the preponderance of our force from the left of our zone, and in consequence decreases our effectiveness in protecting the Division's left flank in accordance with our mission as stated.

4. By employing Course IV we realize all the advantages accruing to Course III. In addition, we materially simplify the problem of maintaining contact with the 1st Marine Division on our right. Further, we encourage the

rapid forward movement of our right assault regiment in the event that resistance in his zone is light. We are, however, faced in this course with the possibility that an excessively rapid advance onto the Airdrome area might result in heavy losses from the dominating terrain from the north and east.

Evaluating the foregoing it appears that the greatest probability of success in accomplishment of our mission may be anticipated in the execution of either Course II or Course IV. Of the two, Course II is the more deliberate, and might result in more effective control and coordination of our forces. Course IV, however, is the more aggressive and provides much greater opportunity for capitalizing on any enemy weakness which may appear in the right assault regiment's zone. Since aggressiveness is a cardinal consideration in combat against the Japanese, who invariably reacts poorly to an opponent who implements his decisions rapidly, and since our mission demands swift capture of the YONTAN AIRDROME it is considered that Course IV offers the greater probability of success.

VI. DECISION

To land on OKINAWA on beaches GREEN and RED at HOW-hour LOVE-day with two CTs abreast, retaining one BLT (minus 1 company) from the right assault regiment in Division Reserve and by a coordinated attack with main effort initially on the left, to seize Hill 400, YONTAN AIRDROME, and that part of L plus 3 northeast of the Airdrome; thereafter to seize the remainder of L plus 3, prepared on order to continue the advance to L plus 5 and succeeding objectives, and to protect the Corps left (north) flank; in order to assist in the seizure and occupation of OKINAWA.

LEMUEL C. SHEPHERD, Jr.
Major General, USMC
Commanding, 6th Marine Division

Annex:

A - Distribution.

Official:

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D-3.